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SILENCE AS A CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE
AND PRACTICE
Abstract: Silence often plays a significant role in Christian experien-
ce and practice. However, the varieties of silence and the effects of
silence for good and. bad merit examination. It is important to distin-
guish between physical, auditory, and metaphorical silence, and bet-
ween experiencing silence as "quiet" and experiencing silence as kee-
ping quiet . Silence can be an instrumental good as weU as an
expressive good, a concomitant good, or a constitutive good. Chris-
tian monks, tiieologians, and other thinkers som.etim.es identify expe-
riences of silence, for example,. as light or dark, as spatially vast or
enclosed, and as temporal or atemporal. Practices of silence can bring
persons closer to God, though a kenotic spirituality; of silence and a
stress on solitude create perils for some members of religious orders,
such as Carthusians. The chief aim of this article is to show, with phi-
losophical techniques, how silence .can be good in manifold ways and
even, perhaps, .an ideal.
Key Words: Carthusians, comraunicatton, David Hume, Martin Laird,
Thomas Merton, monks, mystical darkness, silence, solitude. .
Silence, as both an experience and a practice, is a theme in the
Hebrew Bible and the New Testament1 It has long been a practice in
the Eastern Church and Roman Catholicism, but is generaUy less no-
table and sometimes discouraged in Protestantism.2 Monks and
cloistered nuns have rules pertaining to silence. Some laypersons at-
tend silent retreats and are silent when praying. Some Hturgies make
room for periods of silence. Of course, there is much to be said against
3. Diaxma.id MAcCuLiocR, Silence: A Christian History, Vlsw York, V^kin^ 2013, pp. 11-50.
2. Ibid.. pp. 53-160.
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silence. Silence and its practice are bad or undesirable if they lead, for
example, to emotional paralysis or withdrawal from good human rela-
tionships. They are also bad or undesirable if they conceal wrongdo-
ing, facilitate deceit, express abiding deep-seated anger, or function as
a gendered weapon (e.g. a rule that only men may talk). Also bad or
undesirable is remaining silent out of a desire to wound another per-
son by withholding communication. Yet if one thinks deeply about
silence, one can see there is much to say in its behalf.
1. SOUNDS, NOISE, AND SILENCE
To think about silence one should first think about sound. The
word sound usually covers two different phenomena worth clarifying
here. Physical sounds are longitudinal waves in an elastic medium
such as air or water. Physical sounds are objective in that they can ex-
1st without anyone hearing them. Auditor/ sounds, which are subjec-
tive in that they require a hearer, are sensations created by physical
sounds as they strike the eardrum and related structures of the ear and
as the brain interprets these waves.
For present purposes, we need describe only some differences in
auditory sounds but need not determine whether these sounds are ob-
jects, properties, or events.3 For example, auditoiy sounds differ in
pitch, timbre, and intensity (loudness). T1fie differences help to explain
why we find some auditory sounds, like a breeze flowing through a
grove of trees, soothing or pleasant, but other sounds, such as finger-
nails scraping a chalkboard, as grating or unpleasant. Noise is auditory
sound that a hearer considers harsh, discordant, or excessively loud.
Even more important to understanding Christian experiences and
practices of silence than auditory sounds are the varieties of auditory
silence. Auditory silence includes the absence of auditory sound, the
absence of unintentionally-caused auditory sound, the absence of in-
tentionally-caused auditory sound {quiet), and the act of intentionally
refraining from making an intentional auditory sound (keeping quiet).
Of these, it is quiet and keeping quiet that are central to this study.4
Both depend on human intentions, but the role of intention differs. In
quiet, by definition no intentionally-caused human sound exists in a
3. For an excellent discussion oE these and other issues pertaining to auditory sounds, see Casey
0 CALUCHAN, Sounds: A Philosophical Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2007.
4. For the latter, some might prefer keeping silence on the ground that keeping quiet could suggest
that a. person is trying to avoid detection or commitment rather than pursuing a spiritual practice.
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particular place, however it comes about that there is no such sound.
In keeping quiet a person acts intentionally, perhaps with some effort,
to abstain from making an intentional sound. There is a difference in
scope between quiet and keeping quiet. Quiet exists if it is not the case
that I have an intention to cause auditory sound. Here the negation
has wide scope, and signals that there is no intention. Keeping quiet
exists if I have an intention not to cause an auditory sound. Here the
intention has wide scope, and signals that there is an intention not to
do something - namely, to cause an auditory sound.
Quiet and keeping quiet are related to each other in many ways.
For instance, if I and other people around me successfully keep quiet,
then together we create quiet. In contrast, even if someone hears in-
tentionally-caused human sounds, but has formidable powers of con-
centration, she may be able to keep quiet so that she can concentrate
on something else. This article does not chase down every relation
between quiet and keeping quiet. Quiet is intimately but not exclu-
sively connected with experiences of silence, while keeping quiet is
intimately but not exclusively connected with practices of silence.
Some philosophers think that there is such a thing as hearing si-
lence, but this thinking seems confused. Roy Sorensen, for example,
maintains that though auditory silence is the absence of sound, we can
nevertheless hear silence.5 I respond: if ^here is an absence of audi"
toiy sound, we hear nothing. If a patient is listening intently in an au-
diologist s booth, and if in a particular interval there is no auditory
sound, then the patient hears nothing. There is not some thing called
silence that he hears. The difference between Sorensen and me may lie
in this: I consider auditory silence to be a negation, whereas he seems
to consider it a privation.
What I call metaphorical sound differs markedly from physical
sound and auditoiy sound, but it is importantly related to Christian
experiences and practices of silence. Metaphorical sound consists of
thoughts, concerns, worries, memories, images, inner turmoil, or the
sounds one hears with one's "mind's ear". Metaphorical sounds in
this sense can be pleasant, entertaining, or soothing. But they can also
be unpleasant, frightening, assaultive, or disruptive, in which case they
are metaphorical noise. Metaphorical silence is the absence of meta-
phorical noise and sometimes even the absence of pleasant metaphori-
cat sounds. The presence of metaphorical noise can fill the mind with
5. Roy Sorensen, (tHearing Silence: The Percepdon and Introspection of Absences», m Matthew
NUBDS and Casey O'CALLAGHAN, Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009), pp. 126-45.
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chaos and inner turbulence. Its presence can inhibit or prevent a per-
son from being still and at peace. Even healthy pleasant metaphorical
sounds, such as listening" to a Bach partita in a person s mind, might
lead this person away from contemplating God or listening for God s
voice . The partita is so spirited and captivating that it might get in the
way of something even better. Thus, the significance of metaphorical
silence is that it lays to rest not just metaphorical noise, but even on
occasion pleasant metaphorical sounds and their power over a person s
ability to concentrate, pray, meditate, and gain self-knowledge.
The foregoing rough account of metaphorical sound, noise, and
silence does not overemphasize visual experience as it relates to sound.
To be sure, metaphorical sound includes images, and some memories
are visual. Also, auditory experience often includes direction: a source
of sound is often perceived as above or below me, behind or in front of
me, on my right or on my left. And from perceiving the direction and
identifying the nature of a sound source, such as a train moving north,
I can have a start on learning its location and course. I may judge the
train to be near or far and moving toward or away from me. P. F.
Strawson claims that there is no purely auditory concept of space.6
But he does not deny that that there ^ire contingent connections be-
tween sounds and locations. There are, I think, some analogies and
some disanalogies between auditor/ and metaphorical sound. Even if
Strawson s claim is correct, one possible disanalogy between auditdry
sound and metaphorical sound is that the latter might lack even con-
tingent spatial relations.
In any case, perhaps most metaphorical sounds are nonspatial:
thoughts, concerns, and worries typically lack spatial direction and lo-
cation. Silently humming a symphony in my mind and remembering a
person's voice are nonspatial. And some metaphprical noise, such as
sticky music ("earworms"), is nonspatial. The Beatles' "Penny Lane is
a fine tune, but I do not want it playing repeatedly in my head for
thirty minutes. Like other earworms and forms of metaphorical noise,
it can interfere with concentration and inner calm. Unless we can re-
place metaphorical noise with metaphorical silence on occasion, it can
be hard to develop a successful practice of meditation or quiet prayer.
This study explores the happier side of metaphorical silence, audi-
tory silence as quiet, and auditory silence as keeping quiet in the Chris-
tian tradition. It is partly an essay in the phenomenology of one class
of religious experiences: I offer a philosophical taxonomy of silence
6. P. F. STRAWSON, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen, 1959), ch. 2.
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and investigate Christian experiences of silence, including the perils of
silence and its relation to talk. Here I disagree with both those who
denigrate all religious practices of silence and those who think such
practices a necessary component of Christian life.
David Hume, for example, is a denigrator. He indicts silence along
with other "monjdsh virtues" such as fasting, penance, mortification,
self-demal, and solitude in these words:
the whole train of monkish virtues ... serve to no manner of purpose;
neither advance a man s fortune in the world, nor render him a more
valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of
company, nor increase his power of self-enjoyment ... [Rather] they
cross aU these desirable ends; stupify the understanding and harden the
heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper. We justly, therefore, trans-
fer [these supposed virtues} to the opposite column, and place them in
the catalogue of vices.7
Yet Hume overlooks, I shall argue, ways in which silence can con-
duce to a good life in which one is also helpful to others.
In contrast, Martin Laird writes: Silence is an urgent necessity for
us; silence is necessary if we are to hear God speaking in eternal si-
lence; our own silence is necessary if God is to^hear us".8 Laird is
apparently referring, at least in part, to what I call quiet and keeping
quiet. He does not explicitly distinguish, as I do, between auditory si-
lence and metaphorical silence. I perceive him to be concerned almost
entirely with metaphorical silence. On occasion, though, he has in
mind auditory sounds or noise that disrupts auditory silence.9 Inso-
far as Laird or others point to audltory silence, it is important to exam"
ine that sort of silence in relation to the three independent clauses of
the sentence I quoted at the beginning of this paragraph, First, audi-
tory silence does not seem to be necessary, let alone an urgent neces-
sity. The opposite of auditory silence need not be unbearable noise or
a loud din. Its opposite is the absence of auditory noise. And quiet is
the opposite of any intent! onally-caused noise, which could be a faint,
melodious or soothing sound,.such as humming a lullaby for a brief
while. It does not seem to be a necessity to be rid of the lullaby forever.
7. David HUME, An Enguify Concerning the Principles of Morals [1751], sec. IX, part I, 2nd ed. L. A.
SELBY-BSGGE (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), p.270.
8. Martin LAIRD; Into die Silent Land,' A Guide to the Christian Practice of 'Contemplation (Oxford:
Oxford Univei-sity Press, 2006), p. 2. Some examination of "in eternal siience" is in this section and
some comes later. I find his book helpful and hope not to seem ungrateful by expressing resei'varions
about paits of it.
9. For example, we are tiying to sit in silence with our prayer word, and the people next door start
blasting their music . Ibid., p. 78.
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The second clause appears to be false if we restrict attention to
auditory silence. But Christianity does not hold that God is eternally
silent, or at any rate that God must be eternally silent. Though in the
Hebrew Bible God may show displeasure with the Israelites by silent
withdrawal, eventually God starts talking again.10 Neither are the peo-
pie God created eternally silent. So let us drop in eternal silence" for
the moment. Once dropped, the rest of the second clause seems to be
false. Even if God is not omnipotent. God is certainly very powerful
and surely powerful enough to break through any auditory sounds
people are hearing.
The third clause appears to be false or confused or both. To the
extent that God has anything that resembles human hearing, presum-
ably God's hearing would be quite acute. Even if human beings were
utterly silent. God would know what is on their minds. Moreover, the
third clause supposes that human silence is indispensable to God's
hearing us, whereas if God is to hear us we must be making some
auditory sound, whether faint or loud - unless, of course, God knows
our unvoiced thoughts, which would make our silence irrelevant. The
third clause, and indeed the entire sentence, seems confused if one has
in mind auditory silence, y
In most passages, however, Laird is concerned with what I call
metaphorical silence and metaphorical noise.11 Once these passages
are front and center, the sentence quoted earlier makes a good deal
more sense. To be sure, the second clause seems unhelpful, for God
does have the power to break through the metaphorical noise of our
minds. The third clause also seems unhelpful, because God could pre-
sumably break through any metaphorical noise in our heads and
hear us just fine. Nevertheless metaphorical silence - inner calm or
interior silence - is needed at least from time to time in order to collect
our thoughts and develop a stable sense of self. Furthermore, meta-
phorical silence is ordinarily needed for us to "listen" to God, whether
we become metaphorically silent on our own or God extinguishes any
metaphorical noise in our heads. In these ways Laird enriches our
understanding of metaphorical silence and metaphorical noise.
I will not belabor Hume s denigration of silence or Laird's praise of
it. However, their thoughts suggest that, in understanding silence, we
should be open to differentiating philosophically various kinds of si-
30. MACCULLOCH, Silence, pp. 11-29.
11. See, for example, LAIRD, Into the Silent Land, pp. 4-5 ("inner silence/' "interior silence," "inner
noise, the innec chaos going on in our heads ), p. 22 ("the chaos of the mind"), p. 90 ("inner calm,"
"afflictive thoughts," and "psychodramas"), p. 140 ("inner chatter").
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lence beyond the simple distinction between physical, auditory, and
metaphorical silence and the further distinction between quiet and
keeping quiet'. It is to the task of classifying silence in additional ways
that I now turn.
2, A. TAXONOMY
To understand auditory silence as quiet, first notice that it is not
the same as solitude, soMtariness, a refusal to engage with others, or an
absence of noise caused by animals or natural phenomena such as
thunderstorms. Sometimes quiet can overlap with or accompany these
other things but it is not identical with them, I am concerned chiefly
with ways in which silence might be good. Only in Section 5 do I ad-
dress the conjunction of silence a'nd solitude.
Goods can be either intrinsic or nonintrinsic. As understood here,
an intrinsic good Is good in itself; it rarely derives its goodness from
any other good. Nonintrinsic goods are; almost always derivative; their
goodness comes from some other good. Although the boundary be-
tween intrinsic and nonintrinsic goods is sometimes uncertain, the
concept of a nonmtdnsic good depends on understanding the concept
of an intrinsic good. It is questionable whether silence is good in itself.
The answer depends partly on whether ofte is talking about auditory
or metaphorical silence, or silence as quiet or as keeping quiet.
The taxonomy of silence developed here intersects with the distinc-
tion between intrinsic and nonintrinsic goods. It recognizes instrumen-
tal goods (a class of nonintrinsic goods), as well as what I call expres-
sive, weakly constitutive, strongly constitutive, and concomitant goods.
Instrumental goods serve some end or other. Sometimes auditory
silence is an instrumental good. For instance, if noise resulting from
human activity makes it hard to think clearly, then silence as quiet
would be instrumentally good insofar as it promotes clear thinking.
Intrinsic goods, in contrast, need not serve some end; yet if they do,
their goodness does not derive from serving that end. For example,
auditory or metaphorical silence as quiet that aids clear thinking about
how to organize one s day is instrumentally good for that limited end.
If anything counts as clear thmidng about God, then silence as quiet
that aids such clear thinking may be intrinsically good but is also good
for an intrinsically good end.
Expressive goods are activities or states that display or revea\
something that is intrinsically or nonintrinsically good. For instance,
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running a marathon expresses the good of physical fitness. Similarly,
keeping quiet while meditating on how to be a better person expresses
the good of controlling one's self and surroundings to further a good
end. One s self-control, in turn, is an instrumental good that arguably
advances the intrinsic good of being a better person. Differently, think
of sad, childless Hannah praying inaudibly to God. Inaptly, Eli remon-
strates her for being drunk. She replies that she has had no wine or
strong drink: I am a woman in great trouble ... I am pouring out my
soul before Yahweh ... all this time I have been speaking from the
depthof my grief and my resentment". 1 Sam. 1:15-16 (NIB) Hannah's
unburdening her sadness to God is expressively good because it dis-
plays a healthy recognition of her dependence on God.
A weak constitutive good is an integral part of some larger good but
is not itself intrinsically good. An example comes from one sort of med-
itation. Francis de Sales (1567-1622), in considering what seems to be
keeping quiet in meditation, sees meditation as an activity. It is simply
attentive thought voluntarily repeated or entertained in the mind in or-
der to arouse the will to holy and salutary affections and resolutions".12
This passage does not suggest that silent attentive thinking is intrinsi"
cally good. Instead, this thinking is a smaller part of an activity that
prompts the will to seek both instrumental and intrinsic goods.
A strong constitutive good is an integral part of some larger intrin-
sic good and is itself intrinsically good. To illustrate, justice is good in
itself and is part of a larger good, namefy a good society. It is difficult
to isolate a sort of silence or a practice of silence that satisfies this
definition of a strong constltutive good. A possible example is a period
of silence as quiet during a worship service. If the quiet stems from
awe of God s goodness In a community of like-minded persons, then
the quiet might be both good in itself and part of a larger intrinsic
good, namely a communal liturgy of worship that is also good in itself.
Lastly, there is a concomitant good. It travels along with an intrinsic
good, like a bird perched on a moving wagon, but does not produce,
express, or constitute (weakly or strongly) the intrinsic good. Isaac of
Nlneveh (d. c. 700) paints a picture of silence as a concomitant good:
What is the most precious and the principal characteristic in pure
prayer is the brevity and smallness of any stirrings, and the fact that the
mind simply gazes as though in wonder during this diminution of active
prayer. From this, one of two things occurs £o the mind in connection
12. FRANCIS DE SALES, Treatise on the Love of God [1616], bk. 6, ch. L, trans. John K. RYAN (Garden
City, NY; Doubleday/lmage Books, 1963), vol. !, 272.
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with that brief stirring which weUs up in it: either it withdraws into si-
lence, as a result of the overpowering might of the knowledge which the
intellect has received in a particular verse; or It is held in delight at that
point at which it was aiming during the prayer when it was stirred, and
the heart cultivates it with an insatiable yearning of love. These are the
principle characteristics of pure prayer.13
My concern here is solely with the silence alternative rather than
the delight alternative. Assume that pure prayer as Isaac describes it is
intrinsically good. He does npt say that silence as either quiet or keep"
ing quiet produces, expresses, or constitutes pure prayer. He does say
that the mind retreats into silence, apparently of both sorts, as a result
of new knowledge. This case is one in which an mtainsic good carries
with it a simultaneous nomntrinsic good. Silence as quiet or keeping
quiet is concurrent with reflection on that knowledge in prayer or
meditation.
My classification defends silence of each sort - auditory and meta-
phorical, quiet and keeping quiet - against some of Hume s objections.
He would protest that some of the goods mentioned involve prayer
and the existence of God, and that his works on reKgion at least throw
into doubt God s existence and the defensibility of prayer.14 Neverthe-
less, the taxonomy serves its purpose by laying the groundwork for
thinking about experiences of silence. Silence can be good in each of
the ways delineated in this section. It is a mistake to denigrate silence
as Hum e does.
3. EXPERIENCING SILENCE
What might religious experiences of silence, examined using philo-
sophical techniques, be like? I use the term religions experience in a
broad way to cover mystical experiences, experiences of a religiously
significant reality, and associated feelings of, say, happiness or com-
munion with God in a religious context of prayer or meditation.15
1 3. ISAAC OF NlNEVEH, "Centuries on Knowledge IV.66", in Sebastian BROCK intro. and trans., The
Syriac Fathers on Prayer and the Spiritual Life (Kaiamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1987), pp.
268-69.
14. David HUME, aThe Natural Histoi-y of Religion [1757]i>, in A Dissertation on the Passions; The
Natural Histoiy of Religion: A Critical Edition, ed. Tom L. BEAUCHAMP (Oxford: Clarendon Pj-ess, 2007);
David HUME, Dialogue on Natural Religion and Osher Essays [1 773], ed. Dorothy COLEMAN (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007).
15. This use is roughly the same as that of Mark WEBB, «Religious Experiencew, in Stanford En-
cyclopedia. of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed. Winter 2017), https://pl ato.stanford.edu/entries/rel]-
gious-experience (revised 13 December 2017).
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My question concerns mainly silence as quiet rather than keeping
quiet. The passages quoted from Francis de Sales and Isaac ofNineveh
merely hint at an answer, because they focus on meditation and prayer
rather than the experience of silence itself. Some of Laird's thoughts
are helpful. He has many excellent practical suggestions for those who
want to become silent for religious reasons: make as little sound as
possible; do not move around or fidget; monitor your posture and
breathing; use a prayer word; heighten your awareness; wait for God
to move you or communicate with you as God wills.16
In regard to experiences of silence, Laird stresses what might be
called the spatiaUzatlon of silence. There are, he writes, mutual si-
lences in "the silent land", which is "uncharted and has no definitive
map".17 This land, he says, is vast, open, and light.58 It has a "depth-
less depth , which is partly spatial in that it suggests downward move-
ment or direction, even if the phrase seems to be a contradiction in
terms.19 He quotes various religious writers who characterize some
experiences of silence as spatial.
Although silence as both quiet and keeping quiet can have this char"
acteristic, it need not do so, and the particular spatial terms Laird uses
do not exhaust possible experiences of silence. Senses other than hear-
ing and vision ~ such as touch, smell, and proprioception - can be part
of religious experiences that accompany a practice of silence. A quiet
persons hands can touch each other while she keeps quiet. She can
smell odors, such as incense or flowers. She can sense the position other
body, such as sitting up, lying down, or being inverted in a yoga pose.
These and other states can be simultaneous and are often independent
of silence, even though they attend a practice of silence. These other
senses can also accompany vision and spatial perceptions. A lack of spa-
tial information in silence can make for an experience of emptiness and
uncertainty of location that pertains to apophatic states of awareness.20
Experiences of silence also need not involve a sense of vastness and
being filled with light. The Hebrew Bible has images of God s wings,
and the wings of an angel of God, as sheltering us. Psalm 63:7 says that
in the shadow of your [God's] wings I rejoice". (NJB) Psalm 91:4 says
16. LAiRD.Into the Silent Land, pp. 31-45.
17. Ibid., pp. 2, 3.
18. Ibid.. pp. 18, 67, 142.
19. Ibid..p.S3.
20. The deliverances of the senses are ordinarily instrumental, expressive, or concomitant goods
associated with silence. On occasion silence-associated goods are weakly constitutive. For instance, a
peaceful life, even if it is not intrinsically good, could be an integral part of a Earger good of a life devo-
ted to loving God in silence.
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that God "covers you with his pinions, you find shelter under his
wings and adds, "His constancy is shield and protection . (NJB) An
experience of being beneath divine or angelic wings could involve an
experience' of silence and security marked by a narrow space, and
maybe only the glimpse of a wedge of space beyond the wings. Psalm
27:5 says that God "folds me In the recesses of his tent [sukkah],
where the word tent could refer to a physical tent or be a metaphor
for the temple in Jerusalem. Much later, In Luke 13:34, Jesus expresses
a longing to gather the children of Jerusalem "as a hen gathers her
brood under her wings . (NJB) Some persons close their eyes in silent
prayer. Their sense of space may be imagined if it exists at all. Imag-
ined space could be small, dark, or breezeless.
I offer two comments on tibe phenomenology of religious expert-
ences of silence that are small or dark or both. First, though views from
a mountaintop may be invigorating for many persons, some prefer
small, snug spaces with little or no view. Many creatures, not just hu-
mans, desire such spaces. Den animals like dogs and burrowing animals
like rabbits are examples. Some young children, and even some adults,
like being completely underneath blankets or tables. Some human be-
ings enjoy tiny, confined spaces because of a sense of protection and
security, and a proper subset of these persons seek silence as quiet in
such places. Indeed, Carthusian monks, whom. I discuss later, practice
and experience silence encased, in a way, within their cells.
Second, silence as quiet is sometimes connected with darkness
rather than light. The Christian tradition includes some theologians
and other thinkers who emphasize a mysticism of darkness. This tra-
dition may have its origins in a mix of Plato s allegory of the Cave and
Moses" finding darkness at the top of Mount Sinai.21 Early theologians
associated with this emphasis include Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335 ~ c.
395) and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (dates disputed).22 The
terms commonly given to this perspective are "divine darkness , daz-
zling darkness , and luminous darkness". Perhaps these terms seem
obscure if not internally inconsistent. But the basic idea is apophatic:
even if one escapes the metaphorical darkness of sin, and in turn gains
some knowledge, eventually one confronts an inability to know God
21. PLATO, Repubiic bk. 7; Exod. 19:16-25; D en ys TURNER, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Chris-
tian Mysticism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 31-J8.
22. GREGORY OF NYSSA, The Life of Moses, trans. Abraham X MALHERBE and Everett FERGUSON (Ma-
hwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1 978); PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, The Life of Moses, in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete
Works, trans. Colm LuiBHEm (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987). For useful commentary,
see Hen ri -Charles PUECH, uLa T^nfebi'e mystique chez Je Pseudo-Denys ! Argopagite et dans la Tradition
Patristiques, in his En QuStedela Gnose (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), vol. I, pp. 119-141.
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and to say much about God that is meaningful. Thomas Merton often
connects silence, contemplation, darkness, and apophaticism.23
Perhaps the best-known poetic expression of this mystical dark-
ness is the final stanza of "The Night" by Henry Vaughan (1621-1695):
There is in God (some say)
A deep, but dazling [sic] darkness; As men here
Say it is late and dusky; because they
See not aU clear;
0 for that nightl Where I in him
Might live invisible and dim.24
Connections between an experience of silence as quiet and a mysti-
cism of darkness are difficult to articulate. Vaughan does not say that
the dazzling darkness he refers to is part of his personal experience.
The parenthetical qualification - "some say" - reveals his caution. The
darkness to which Vaughan refers is neither the dark night of the soul
nor carnal darkness nor the darkness of sin and ignorance. Rather,
Vaughan s dark night seems to be "a withdrawal of the soul from the
things of the earth by a great desire and longing to love and see and
experience Jesus and spiritual things ,25 A difficult issue is whether
anyone who has had this sort of personal experience can clarify it. If it
is an experience of something, it is hard to know whether two persons
who claim to have had such an experietice could settle a dispute about
what the experience is like. Some sense of dazzling darkness might not
be an experience of anything. But if this is so, this sense seems more
like a state of consciousness whose content is elusive. Moreover, it is
partly an empirical issue whether all who claim to have been in such a
state would supply the same descriptions of it. There are also linguistic
and historical issues in understanding apophatic mysticism.26
By no means do all devotees of a mysticism of darkness practice
keeping quiet for religious reasons. Still, the phenomenology of reli-
23. See John F. TEAHAN, «A Dark and Empty Way: Thomas Merton and the Apophatic Traditionn,
Joumal of Religion, 58 (1978), pp. 263-287. In pa rtiai contrast, Martin Lairdin w.Gregory ofNyssaand
the M.ysticism of Darkness: A'R.econsider&tiow Journal of Religion, 79 (1999), pp. 592-616, argues that
Gregory's woi'ks also reveal a mysticism of light. LAI&D, Into the Silent Land, pp. 68-70, emphasizes
luminous vastaess over "luminous darkness".
24. From Henry VAUGHAN, «Silex Scintillans [1650, 1655]», in Leonard Cyril MARTIN, ed., Tiie Works
of Henry Vaughan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd ed. 1957), pp. 522-523. R. A. DURR, wVaughan's 'The
Night», Journal of English and Germanic Pkilology, 59 (I960), pp. 34-40, associates dazzling darkness
[n Vaughans poem mainly with the Christian tradition and Pseudo-Dionysius.
25. R. A. DURR, On the Mystical Poetry of Henry Vaugfian CCambridge, MA: Hai-vard University
Press, 1962), pp. 113, 171 (quoting Waiter HILTON).
26. Compare TuRHER.,77te£>af'A:nes.T of God, with Bernard McGiNN's review in tb'e Journal of ReSigion,
77 (1997), pp. 309-11.
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gious experiences of silence can be joined to distinctly mystical views
of God. Dazzling darkness is a part of a few, but hardly all, religious
experiences of silence as quiet, or at least is part of associated states of
consciousness.
From space and noctumal mysticism I move to time. Experiences
of silence can also be temporal or atemporal without being spatial. An
experience of silence is temporal if the silent person (whether inten-
tionally or nonintentionally silent) is aware of the passing of time
through, say, the hands on a clock, the continuously shifting sunlight
coming through a window, or a growing awareness of hunger.27 An
experience of silence is atemporal for present purposes if the inten-
flonally-silent person is unaware of the passing of time. To illustrate,
if one is oblivious to the burning down of a candle and insulated from
both the usual rhythms of the day and all time-keeping devices, then
ones experience could be atemporal in my sense. For most people,
temporal experiences of silence are likely more common than atempo-
ral experiences, but for some people it could be the opposite. A par-
ticular person might experience silence temporally on some occasions
but atemporally on others.
Further, the distinction between atemporal and temporal experi-
ences of silence, respectively, need not track the distinction between
intrinsic and nonintrinsic goods associated with silence. Some prac-
tices of silent prayer may have periods in which the person praying is
unaware of the passing of time. Yet the atemporal character of this
experience may not make it intrinsically better than a corresponding
experience in which the person praying is aware that time is passing.
By writing that we need inner silence (Le. metaphorical silence) if
we are to hear God speak in eternal silence", Laird runs into further
difficulties surrounding time and experiences of silence.28 He uses
hear and speak metaphorically, yet I do not think Laird means that
God is simultaneously both remaining metaphorically silent and met-
aphorically speaking to us, though God might be silent for one person
and speaking to a different person. Neither, I think, does he mean that
across eternal time (eternal for both past and future in God's case and
eternal for the future in the case of human beings) God is constantly
speaking to us. Perhaps we are to understand the phrase "in eternal
27. I lay to one side, as not directly in point, the philosophical issue of whether the passage of time
is unreal or iliusoiy. Cf. Michael DUMMETT, «A Defense of McTaggai-t's Proof of the Urn'eality of Time»,
Philosophical Review, 69 (1960), pp. 497-504; Simon PROSSER, «Why Does Time Seem to Pass?», PhUo-
sophy and Phenomenological Research, 85 (2012), pp. 92-136.
28. LAIRD, Into the Silent Land,p.2; see note 8 above.
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silence" in this way: if God is outside time, and if a person is in meta-
phorically-silent union with God, then this person s experience could
take her or him outside time and be in that sense eternal. This possible
interpretation is metaphysically challenging, for it is unclear how we
are to grasp a sense of the "eternal that is outside of time for God but
in time for us. A different, and much less metaphysically challenging,
interpretation of in eternal silence is this: if a person is in metaphor-
ically-silent union with God, then when God speaks , the person finds
any "words" "spoken" by God to be quite beyond the point. This last
interpretation allows for a spiritual state, divorced from. language and
metaphorical sound, in which some experience of God occurs.
The foregoing observations matter because we can appreciate and
benefit from our nonspatial, darkness-laden, and atemporal experi"
ences of silence as quiet. If we were to concentrate solely on the spa-
tial, we might be tempted to think'that we are "not doing silence right
unless the experience of silence manifested itself as spatial and moreo-
ver as vast and light. Instead, our experiences of silence could also in-
volve darkness, soothing touch, the smell of burning incense, and bod-
ily sensations. These experiences could be temporal or atemporal
aswell. If the term silence points to anything, it need not point to the
ineffable. For Francis de Sales, silent meditation is a process of atten-
tive thought that excites the will in certain ways. For Isaac of Nineveh,
silence is a concomitant outgrowth of pure prayer in which the intel-
lect receives knowledge. It would be a step too far to say that Francis
and Isaac are specifically interested, as I am, in how silence relates to
a particular kind of mtentionally-caused human sound, even if that
relation can deepen our understanding of some kinds of silence.
4. DEEPER INTO SILENCE
We began with two sorts of silence: quiet and keeping quiet. We
can deepen our understanding of both sorts by relating them to talk.
In the philosophy of language, talk is usually oral communication.
There are many other forms of communication: touch, writing, ges-
tures, kissing, body language, smoke signals, and so on. Talk is impor-
tant here because it involves intentionally-caused human sound. So
far as the absence of talk is concerned, it is useful to distinguish be"
tween intermittent silence and silence before and after talking.29
29. Bernard P. DAUENHAUER, Sil&nce-' The Phenomenon and its Ontotogical Significance (Blooming-
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Intermittent silence exists in at least three different forms. One is
the silence between most words that exists in all human languages. If
talk lacked even the slightest pause between words, it would be much
harder to understand what someone is saying. A second form is the
silence between breaths that facilitates conversation and discussion..
From an academic conference many years ago, I recall the following
partly testy, partly amusing exchange involving two scholars, A and B.
A spoke more rapidly than anyone I have listened to before or since:
A: (ending a long argument) ... and that disconfirms the hypothesis".
B: "It seems to me that...
A (interrupting): I wasn t finished".
B (mode apology): "Sony, I thought you were done. Most of us take a
breath between paragraphs .
Almost no one has the lung capacity to talk without a breath for
more than a minute. A third form of intermittent silence is cultural: in
conversation there is some back-and-forth and thus some silence be-
tween the utterances of two or more speakers.
In all three forms, the existence of a short interval of silence makes
talk intelligible, as well as better understood and respectful of partici-
pation by others. A healthy silence facilitates listening. Really listening
to others is important because it respects other human beings whose
thoughts and emotions may differ from ours. It also involves humility:
when we really listen to others, we are stepping back from insisting on
our own speech, and from attaching so much significance to what we
say and think.
Silence before and after talking might initially seem the same as the
last form of intermittent silence. But in my usage silence before and af-
ter talking can involve rather longer periods of silence than is common
in conversation. Here the silence can be ended repeatedly, or the silence
can continue indefinitely. Repeated periods of silence, which might last
hours or days or even weeks, do not occur in typical conversations.
Sometimes they happen because one person needs to attend to another
task. Longer periods can happen among hermits who remain in silent
solitude until they have a visitor. Episodic periods of silence can occur
among Quakers because they are waiting for the Spirit's inspiration to
speak. During a meeting, Individuals practicing Quaker silent waiting
are equals: no individual is privileged, on human merits, to speak to
ton: Indiana University Press, 1 980), pp. 6-16, calls these "intervening silence" and "fore-and-after si-
lence .
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anyone else. From an outsider's perspective, Quaker silent worship and
waiting are an expression of egalitarianism and the practical need to
have a place where like-minded persons can be together. To Quakers,
this silent ritual is quiet listening and sometimes a sense of awe.30
Talk that ends in indefinite, and perhaps permanent, silence is in-
teresting. Some cases are sad, such as deaf mutes or persons who have
lost the ability to speak, but to some might not seem Interesting from
a philosophical point of view. However, it is quite interesting if people
cease to speak because they believe it is pointless to say anything more.
Indeed, a person who believes that God is ultimately mcomprehensi-
ble should at some point remain silent, for if something is ineffable, it
makes little sense for that person to try to say anything about it.31
Thomas Aquinas, in the last few months of his life, ceased to speak or
write on theology, though the historical record is inadequate to ex-
plain why he fell silent. Quite differently, a person could stop speaking
with someone out of anger and bitterness.32 This silence is not polite
or prayerful; it is a wounding, antagonistic, or wintry silence. Here the
decision to remain silent often issues from a desire to harm the other
person by withholding communication. Acting on such a desire is
morally problematic, but it is just one of many examples of how si-
lence can lead to bad results. Silence, if practiced to its outer limits,
presents various hazards, even in Christian practice.
5. PERILS OF PROFESSIONAL SILENCE AND SOLITUDE
The Carthusian Order, founded in 1084, has the most rigorous
practices of silence and solitude in western monasticism. Its monks
and cloistered nuns may experience the temporal and spatial charac-
teristics of silence and solitude somewhat differently from the expert"
ences had by most other monks, cloistered nuns, clergy or lay people.
Indeed Carthusian experiences of time and space, and their life of si-
lence and solitude, may create some perils for them.
30. Rudolf OTTO, The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W. HARVEY (London, Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 1923), pp. 210-214. More recently, see Rachel MUERS, Keeping Gods Silence:
Towards a Theological Ethics of Communication (Maiden, MA, Oxford UK» and Carlton, Victoria, Aus-
U-aiia: Blackwell PubiishEng, 2004).
31. It could, however, be possible for a different individual who has greater cognitive and iinguis-
tie capacities than the person I am imagining to express things that this person cannot Sebastian
GAB, «The Paradox of Ineffabsii£y», InternationaE Journal of Philosophy and Theology, 78 (2017),
pp. 289-300.
32. Alain COR.BIN, A History of Silence: From the Renaissance to the Present Day [2016], trans. Jean
BiiiRELL (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2018), pp. 96-107, explores both hate-filled silence and various
silences of Eove in intimate relationships.
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Philip Greening s film Die grosse Stille^ gives the outside world a
look into the Grande Chartreuse, the chief charterhouse of the Carthu-
sian order located in the mountains near Grenoble. The film offers no
commentary or musical score. The sacristan s bell signals the time ac-
cording to the horarium, which varies somewhat across charterhous-
es, monks, seasons, and days of the week.34 The following times are
approximate. Monks rise and pray in cell at 11:30 p.m. Matins and
Lauds begin around 12:15 a.m. in the chapel and last two or three
hours, after which the monks sleep till around 6:30 a.m., with Prime at
7:00 a.m. followed by a conventual Mass in the chapel at 8:00 a.m,
Terce is at 10:00 a.m. and Sext at 12 noon, with some opportunity dur-
ing the morning for prayer, private Masses, lectio divina, and a period
for study or work. Monks eat their midday meal in cell and have time
for work and recreation until None at 2:06 p.m. and Vespers at 4:00
p.m. There is a light meal (collation) between Vespers and Compline,
which begins at 6:45 p.m. After Compline the monks sleep from 7:30
or 8:00 p. m. until it is time to rise for Matins at ll:30p.m. Monks con-
sume most meals in cell, and silence prevails for communal meals on
Sundays and holy days. The monks take a walk of several hours once
a week, and they may talk with each other en route. Vatican II reforms
narrow the gulf between choir monks and brothers,, and increase the
interaction between solemnly professed monks and other monks.
Carthusian monks internalize the horarium in a way that may af-
feet their experience of time. They rarely have watches or clocks, so
the bell tells them when they need to go to the next office or activity.
Viewers of Groening s film may sense that time is effectively softened
and elongated" through recurring rituals ,35 The monks themselves
experience time in various ways: as recurring, as elapsing while chant-
ing, as remembering the past, and as awareness of inner time-con-
sciousness, for example. Some viewers of the film, and some monks,
develop an internal sense of time that silence points to" but they may
"also begin to feel its opposite, a sense of timelessness".36 These are
echoes of earlier themes concerning the spatial, dark, temporal, and
atemporal aspects of silence.
33. Into Great Silence, Zeitgeist Films, 2005.
34. http://www.charu'eux.org/en/monks/caithusian-day.p]ip (last accessed 3 November 2019). Car-
thusian nuns follow a similar protocol. The horarium sketched momentarily does not mention that the
eight canonical offices (Matins, Lauds, Prime, Terce, Sext, None, Vespers, and Compline) are preceded
or followed by Hke-named offices devoted to Mary and usually obsei-ved in ceii.
35. Henry SCHWARTZ, wTemporal Transformations in Cinema and Psych oanalysis: On Philip
Groemng's Into Great Silences, International Journal ofPsyckoanaiysis, 90 (2009), pp. 909-915, especia-
lly pp.909,910.
36. Ibid., 911.
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Carthusian practice and Groening's film suggest at least two per-
spectives on monastlc space in the cell. First, radiating outward
from. each monk's body in the innermost part of the cell (the cubicu-
lum) - which consists of his bed, prie-dieu, table, chair, and a cruci-
fix on a wall - is the rest of his cell (typically two to four rooms alto-
gether), the charterhouse buildings, the wall around the charterhouse,
the property boundary of the monastery as a whole, the earth, and
the universe. Second, the rest of the universe surrounds the earth,
which includes in turn the property boundary of the entire monas-
tery, the wall around the charterhouse, its buildings, the monk s cell,
its cubiculum, and the monk's body inside the cubiculum. As Nancy
Maguire puts it, "Layers of concentric circles wrap the monk in soli-
tude, enclose him, protect him from any awareness of secular life ,37
No one can enter [the cnbiculum} without the monk s permission ,
she continues, and [a]t the center of these protective circles, the
monk's own diligence and prayer protect his interior life".38 Viewed
in the second way, the monk is for a significant part of each day
nested in a small, snug space that makes room for security in silence
and solitude.39
Earlier I distinguished silence from solitude. It is possible to have
neither, both, or one without the other. To address possible perils of
Carthusian life one should consider silence and solitude together. Car-
thusians are not hermits but combine anchoritic and coenobitic as-
pects of monastic life. Two Trappist monks who are performing a joint
task, like chopping vegetables, can communicate, despite their silence,
through hand signals. Two Carthusians performing the same task have
no hand signals and may even stand well apart from. each other as they
work. The hoods of Carthusian monks are often up, i.e. pulled upward
and forward so that it is not possible for a monk to communicate by
nods or glances with adjacent monks. Above all, a great deal of the
monks' time is spent in prayer and contemplation in cell. Few men
have the temperament to endure and profit from such silence and sol-
itude, season after season, and year after year. Perhaps for this reason
those who remain in a charterhouse for many decades might seem to
live a sublime life.40 Here silence as quiet and keeping quiet along
37. Nancy KLEIN MAGUIRE, An Infinity of Little Hours: Five Young Men and Their Trial of Faith in the
Western Worlds Most Austere M.onastic Order (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2006), p. 26.
38. Ibid.
39. Peter NISSEN, uCarthusian Worlds, Carthussan Images: The Fascination of Silence and Inacces-
sibilitya. Studies in Spirituality, 24 (2014), pp. 143-512, is an insightful study of these themes.
40. Robin Bruce LOCKHART, Halfway to Heaven: The Hidden Life of the Sublime Carthiisians (London:
Thames Methuen, 1985).
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with solitude are instrumental, expressive, concomitant, and weakly
constitutive goods in a life devoted to God.
From recent sources in English, doubts have arisen about the sus-
tainability and health of the Carthusian calling even among persons
who might otherwise be a Benedictine or a Cistercian monk. Here are
two examples, though sources in other languages and other countries
might tell a different story, Maguire's study of five Carthusian novices
who entered the English charterhouse at Parkminster in 1960-1961,
only one of whom eventually became a solemnly professed monk who
stayed there indefinitely, identifies perils that many of these men
faced. They include psychological tensions, psychosomatic ailments,
personal duels between past and present novice masters, disputes over
who is really a Carthusian monk, and squabbles over choir perfor-
mance. As to the last, it turns out that some monks can carry a tune
and others cannot, and that some monks care about the quality of the
choir and others do not.41
Father Benedict Kossmann s memoir of twenty years in Carthusi-
an charterhouses in Spain and Vermont is more personal.42 For many
years he loved the cell's silence and solitude.43 Often he disliked mo-
nastic responsibilities such as serving .as chanter or novice master.
Sometimes he experienced frustration with the choir, chafed under
his prior, and suffered from severe headaches that seemed to defy di-
agnosis. Eventually, he found no enjoyment in anything \ and a priest
psychiatrist opined that. "by remaining in the monastery [Kossmann]
was destroying [his] personality".44 But the Spanish charterhouse in
which he began had inculcated a culture of nothingness. Despite his
initial love of silence and solitude, Kossmann concluded that "[his]
spirituality of nothingness was leading to a destruction or disappear-
ance of [his] human personality".45 In time, he found the cell to be
emotionally and physically very difficult. He sought, and received per-
mission, to be released from the Order and the priesthood.
However, neither Kossmann nor the five monks discussed in detail
by Maguire regretted their years in a charterhouse. For Kossmann in
the late stages of his time as a Carthusian, silence and solitude did not
seem to be goods. The same appears true of some of the five monks on
whom Maguire concentrates. Or, at least, in both cases the good fea-
41. MAGU!RE,AM Infinity of Little Hours, passim.
42. Father Benedict KOSSMANN, Sounds of Silence ... A Monk's Journey (Bloom ington, IN; Author-
House, 2005). It is not clear to me whether the author's name is, at least in part, a pseudonym.
43. Ibid., pp. 244-46.
44. Ibid., pp. 249, 251.
45, Ibid., p. 251.
272 S. R. MUNZER
tures of silence and solitude appear to be mixed with adverse or de-
structive features. It is not clear whether either silence or solitude, or
both together, cause bad results; or whether there is some more com-
plicated function between silence, solitude, and each individual monk
at a particular time and place that explains why Carthusian life did not
ultimately work well for some of these men.
Yet one of the perils of silence and solitude may lie in kenotic spir-
ituality: an emptying out of the monk's self. Mlore precisely, silence
and solitude contribute to a peril that ultimately derives from kenotic
spirituality. The connection is contingent rather than necessary.
Kenosis means different things to different scholars and monks.46
A prominent meaning is throwing out the "false self" while holding
onto the "true self". Sustained prayer and contemplation can identify
bits of falseness in the monk's self. Examples include egoism, self-as-
sertion, and pride in what seems to him his spiritual progress. Once
identified, these bits can be ground down and cast out from his make-
up. To say that these things can happen is not to say that they will
happen. Moreover, how is a monk to distinguish clearly and consist-
ently between his false self and his true self? Even with the aid of a
confessor or spiritual director, he may find it hard to do so. Again, a
monk is scarcely immune to self-ignorance and self-deceptEon. A med"
itation of Guigo I (1083-1136), the fifth Prior of the Grande Chartreuse,
puts the matter starkly: "See how ignorant you are of your own self;
there is no land so distant or so unknown to you, nor one about which
you will so easily believe in falsehoods".47
Merton, a Trappist whose spirituality is likely to resonate with that
of some Carthusians, fluctuates in what he says about the false self
and the true self.48 Frequently he associates the false self with sin: To
say I was born in sin is to say I came into the world with a false self ,49
This view seems to rest on some version of original sin, which many
Orthodox Christians reject, even if they allow that a person s own sins
may lead to one kind of false self. Other kinds of false self issue from
self-ignorance, or from faults that do not rise to the level of sin. As-
46. E.g., Marie BAIRD, aTowai-d a Kenotic Model of Spiritual Subjectivity», Studies in Spintuality,
26(2016), pp. 45-58 (drawing on contemporat-y work by Emmanuel Levinas and Gianr)]Vattimo);Neil
PEMBROKE, «Two Spiritualities of Seif-Emp tying: Weii's 'Decreation' and Merton's Emptying Out the
False Self", Studies in Spintuality, 25 (2015), pp. 267-78 (preEerring Thomas Mertan's emptying of the
false self to Simone WeiIJs destiuction of the self).
47. Tlie Meditations ofGuigo I, Prior of the Charterhouse, trans. and intro. A. Gordon MURSELL (Ka-
[amazoo, MI, and Spencer, MA, Cistercian Publications, 1995) (no. 303), p. 231.1 use the translation in
R. W, SOUTWERN, The taking of the Middle Ages (Kew Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 231, which
is more accurate than Mursei!s.
48. SeeTEAHAN, uA Dark and Empty Way», note 23 above, especially pp. 270, 277-81,283.
49. Thomas MERTON, Seeds of Contemplation (Norfolk, CT: New Directions Books, 1949), pp. 27.
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tutely, Merton identifies still other kinds of false self: a shadow self
that tricks us, and even a Promethean self that considers itself to be
like a god. His works inventory many kinds of false self.
Merton's writings throw less light on the true self.50 It does not suf-
fice to say that the true self is what remains once every bit and every
kind of false self has been jettisoned, because that does not elucidate
what the true self is, and because there might be a neutral self in be-
tween a false self and the true self. Plus, no one can without God s grace
be sure that every bit and kind of false self is gone. Merton wavers be-
tween saying that each person has to discover his or her tone self or has
to create his or her true self. Either way, it is unclear whether a person s
true self, once discovered or created, can change. Moreover, it is un-
helpful to suggest that each person is nothing before God, as Mlerton
sometimes appears to do. In the Christian tradition, after all, each per-
son is a child of God and made in God s image and likeness.
The Carthusian life is an ideal of sorts, and it makes little differ-
ence that so few have a calling to it. At present, there are roughly 370
monks in nineteen charterhouses and 75 nuns in five charterhouses
across the globe. It is a worthy project, sometimes made available by a
life of silence and solitude, to put away self-ignorance and self-decep-
tion in favor of a deeper knowledge of a person s motivations and a
greater love of God. The Carthusian life involves substantial amounts
of solitude and auditory and metaphorical silence.
As an ideal, a life of silence and solitude might seem too inward
and too self-centered. It might also seem to be partial, in that it manl-
fests love of God with insufficient manifestation of love toward per-
sons other than oneself.
The merits of the foregoing reservations - excessive inwardness,
self-centeredness, and partiality ~ depend in part on one's views of in-
tercessory prayer. For Carthusians, these forms of prayer are part of
their chosen life. Further, the exposition of the love commandment
along with the parable of the good Samaritan and the Mary-Martha
story (Luke 10:25-42), whether read traditionally as "one thing is neces-
sary or read nontraditionally as few things are necessary or just one",
heeds Laird s advice and the Carthusian way about the "necessity of
loving God in contemplative prayer.51 We should, moreover, allow that
50. Cf. Walter E. CONN, wSelf-Transcendence, the Ti-ue Seif, and Self-Loven, Pastoral Psychology, 46
(1998), pp. 323-32, especially pp. 327-29.
51. See Peter C. ERB, wThe Contemplative Life as the Unum Necessarium: In Defense of a Traditio-
na] Reading of Luke 10:42», Mystics Quarterly, 11 (no.4,1985), pp. ] 61-64. TheNIB has "and yet few
[things] are needed, indeed only one", and in a note it makes Hstening to the word of God as the "one
thing necessary,
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ideals vary across time and across persons, and that some ideals clash
with others,52 If at times silence and solitude are part of a larger intrin-
sically good life, and if they are integral to this intrinsically good Kfe,
then they may well be strong constltutive goods at those times.
6. CONCLUSION
Indeed, we ought not to lose sight of how both Christian experi-
ences and practices of silence can each be parts of a larger, intrinsi-
cally good Christian life. We should not say, with Hume, that this so-
called "monkish virtue" inevitably "cross[es] all desirable ends .
Silence has much to recommend it. Silence can cause, lead to, express,
make up, or travel with other goods ~ so long as one steers clear of
perils such as kenotic spirituality and unrestrained solitariness.
Still, just as silence can concomitantly travel along with certain
goods, so can undesirable traits like excessive inwardness and self-cen-
teredness travel along with silence. With discemment we can thread the
needle between judging silence as entirely bad and maintaining that si-
lence is indispensable to a Christian life. Salutary silence lies some-
where in between.53
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52. See P. F. STEUWSON, «Social Morality and Individual Ideals, Philosophy, 36 (1961), pp. 1-17, es-
peciallypp. 1-4, 16-17.
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